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THE BUILDING PERMIT AND RELIANCE
THEREON IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The right to free, unhampered use of real property in South
Carolina has been severely restricted by recent developments
which have drastically changed the nature of what was once pri-
marily a rural, agricultural state. The growth of urban com-
plexes and the instrusion of new industrial developments have
combined to limit this once sacred privilege of the property own-
er. The municipality's power to zone has passed the constitu-
tional obstacle, and it may be surmised that zoning ordinances
will soon be established in every urban center of any size in this
state.
Consider the following situation, which is not an unusual one.
An attorney is consulted regarding the use of certain land. His
client either (1) owns the land and desires to put it to a certain
use, (2) is interested in buying the land for that purpose, or (3)
is desirous of leasing it to someone who will put it to the partic-
ular use. The desired use is in conformity with the current zon-
ing ordinance. The client wants an assurance of his right to be-
gin transformation of the property into the permitted use. The
attorney in South Carolina who finds himself in this situation
will be confronted with a series of unanswered questions and con-
tradicting opinions. This discussion will attempt to aid him in
determining what rights, if any, his client has.
I. Tim RIGirr To REQUmE A BuImynT Pm IT
The right of a municipality to require a building permit be-
fore any construction is undertaken is no longer an open question
in any jurisdiction in this country. Ordinances requiring that
such a permit be obtained from the municipality have been con-
sistently upheld as a valid exercise of the police power vested in
municipalities.1
II. Tnm EmmT_ or APPricABnE ORniNAwcEs ON Tm
Issu 'cn or BumDiG PEmrrs
A. Administration
When a valid zoning ordinance covers the area for which the
building permit is desired, and the desired use of the land is per-
1. 1 E. Yoxir, ZomNNG LAW AND PRAcTcz § 9-2, at 395 (3d ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as Yoxy].
1
Allen: The Building Permit and Reliance Thereon in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1969
mitted by the ordinance, the issuing official (generally the build-
ing inspector) has no right arbitrarily to refuse to issue the per-
mit.2 The building plans must meet the specifications of local
building ordinances. If this is so, and the proposed use is a pro-
per one, the building inspector must issue the permit. The offi-
cial's discretion extends only to a determination of conformity
with permited uses and building ordinance requirements. It does
not allow him to refuse issuance of a permit if all statutory re-
quirements are met.3
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel issuance of an im-
properly refused building permit.4 This rule has been in effect
in South Carolina for many years.5 To obtain a writ of
mandamus, the applicant must show: (1) that the duty to be per-
formed is ministerial in character; (2) that the applicant has a
legal right to the discharge of that duty; (3) that there is no
other adequate remedy available to the applicant.6 In the area
of building permits, if the applicant can show compliance with
the applicable ordinances, a court should require the building
official to issue the permit.
7
B. Cos titutionality
Ordinances which limit property rights must be uniform in
nature, and must be uniformly administered. An ordinance may
be uniform on its face and have been passed for a valid public
purpose. Yet if it is discriminatorily enforced, a court will not
hesitate to invalidate it as an unconstitutional deprivation of
property.8 Our supreme court has never held that the police
power is a carte blanche to pass unreasonable ordinances. How-
ever, the court's definition of a reasonable ordinance has wavered
over the years. Zoning discretion of municipalities has generally
been upheld where the division of a city into residential, busi-
ness, and industrial segments is involved.9 More difficulty has
arisen over the problem of the prohibition of particular uses
2. 101 CJ.S. Zoning § 346, at 1174 (1958).
3. 1 YO LEY § 9-3, at 396.
4. 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 346, at 1174 (1958).
5. See Henderson v. City of Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 21, 172 S.E. 689,
691 (1934).
6. Lake v. Mercer, 214 S.C. 189, 194, 51 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Henderson v. City of Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 22, 172 S.E.
689, 691 (1934).
8. Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 273, 20 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1942).
9. E.g., Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Bd. of Adjustment, 222 S.C. 165, 169, 72
S.E.2d 66, 68 (1952).
NOTE~S1968]
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over a wide area. The court has voided an ordinance which
required special permission of the city council to erect any
structure within two hundred feet of any railroad crossing
within the city limits, characterizing it as a "drastic and un-
reasonable law.' 0  An ordinance prohibiting erection of any
billboard facing a public street or public place without a special
permit from the city council was stricken because "it commits
to the unrestrained will of the city authorities, for any reason
deemed satisfactory to them, the right and power to absolutely
prohibit the use of property for the erection of billboards.""-
Obviously, then, unlimited discretion in municipal officials will
serve to void such a prohibitive ordinance. A standard by which
the impartial enforcement of the ordinance can be secured is
necessary.12
The court has upheld the prohibition of stables within a
municipality's limits, although the ordinance was in the same
form as in Sodoss (requiring special permission from the city
council) ."' However, this ordinance listed five factors which the
city council would use in determining whether or not to grant
the permit.14 Therefore, the court saw no danger of arbitrary
enforcement. In the Henderson opinion, the court distinguished
Douglass because only one type of building was prohibited there;
therefore curtailment of free land use was less severe.'5 A more
basic distinction would seem to be the limiting standards in
Douglass, compared with the unbridled discretion of the city
council in Henderson.
A more definite ground of unconstitutionality was handed
down in Wilis v. Oity of Woodruff.:6 Here the plaintiff desired
to build a service station next to his residence, in a residential
section. The city council passed a motion that his request for a
building permit be granted if, among other requirements, it was
agreeable with the surrounding property owners. The building
inspector apparently issued the permit without consulting with
the plaintiff's neighbors, who immediately protested. The city
council then passed a resolution invalidating the permit unless
10. Henderson v. City of Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 24, 172 S.E. 689, 692
(1934).
11. Schloss Poster Advertising Co. v. City of Rock Hill, 190 S.C. 92, 96,
2 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1939).
12. Id.
13. Douglass v. City Council of Greenville, 92 S.C. 374, 75 S.E. 687 (1912).
14. Id. at 378, 75 S.E. at 688. For example, the possible danger to pedestrians.
15. Henderson v. City of Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 25, 172 S.E. 689, 692
(1934).
16. 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.22d 699 (1942).
[Viol. 21
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the plaintiff obtained the requisite permission from the surround-
ing landowners. On review, this procedure was invalidated by
the court, holding that a municipality cannot make a lawful use
of property 17 conditional upon the assent of the owners of
neighboring property.'8
C. Compliance with Administratiove Procedure
Although it is hardly to be doubted that a landowner desiring
to make a particular use of his land must comply fully with the
procedure set out by the applicable zoning and building ordi-
nances, this requirement applies equally to the municipality
desiring to deny the particular use to the landowner. The
typical zoning ordinance places the original determination of
whether or not to issue the building permit in a building in-
spector, with provision for appeal of his decision to a zoning
board of adjustment. Such was the situation in Lominicl . City
of Aiken."9 Here, after the plaintiff had obtained a building
permit from the building inspector, the city council, following a
complaint from neighboring landowners, revoked it. The plain-
tiff appealed to the zoning board of adjustment. The city council
advised the board to revoke the permit. The plaintiff then
sought a judicial determination of the validity of the permit.
The state supreme court held that the city council had no
authority to revoke the permit.20 Nor would the court allow the
city council to attack the original decision of the building in-
spector since the council had failed to appeal that decision to




Zoning ordinances usually contain a provision by which a
variance from the terms of a zoning ordinance may be authorized
in instances where literal enforcement of the ordinance would
result in "unnecessary hardships."22 The Columbia zoning ordi-
17. The court found the use lawful since the city council had otherwise
agreed to it. Id. at 272, 20 S.E2d at 701.
18. Id.; see Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 551 (1952).
19. 244 S.C. 32, 135 S.E2d 305 (1964).
20. Id. at 43, 135 S.E.2d at 310.
21. Id. at 44, 135 S.E2d at 310.
22. 2 YoxEY § 15-4, at 139. A variance, which allows the landowner to
use his land in a manner forbidden by the ordinance, should be distinguished
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nance contains such a provision, which seems to be representative
of the variance provisions in zoning ordinances in other munici-
palities in South Carolina.
23
Although a variance has not been involved in most of the
building permit cases in this state, a South Carolina landowner
may feel more secure in his right to make a particular use of his
land if he has obtained one. While a building permit is a
personal right and, as will be pointed out later in this discus-
sion, is inalienable, a variance is a vested right which attaches
to the land, and runs with it if the land is subsequently trans-
ferred, a distinction which was determinative in Nuckles v.
Allen, 24 in which the court emphasized that a variance "inures
to the benefit of the land,"25 and is available to a subsequent
purchaser. Therefore, although the plaintiff's transferor had
failed to avail himself of his right to put the land to the
particular use (the erection of a motel), the variance, running
with the land, was still available to the plaintiff.26
In Nuoc les, the zoning board of adjustment attempted to
rescind the variance. The court refused to allow this, pointing
out that the conditions affecting the use of the property were
unchanged since the variance was originally granted, and that
the zoning board of adjustment had offered no other justifica-
tion for its action.27 The possibility of sufficient justification
to override a vested right is discussed later in this article.
B. Building Permits
While a variance inures to the benefit of the land, a building
permit is generally regarded as only a personal privilege granted
to the applicant which, of itself, confers no vested right upon
him.2 8 In addition, the privilege conferred is often of limited
duration, and may expire if not acted upon within a certain
period.29
Disputes frequently arise when, after a building permit has
been validly issued in conformity with the applicable ordinances,
a subsequent effort is made to revoke the permit or declare it
23. Columbia, S.C., Zoning Ordinance § 320.03, Feb. 6, 1963.
24. 250 S.C. 123, 156 S.E.2d 633 (1967).
25. Id. at 131, 156 S.E.2d at 637.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Palmetto Petroleum, Inc. v. City of Mullins, 251 S.C. 24, 27, 159
S.E.2d 854, 856 (1968).
29. Columbia, S.C., Zoning Ordinance § 300.06, Feb. 6, 1963.
[VTol. 21
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inoperative. Such problems have caused the development of a
principle generally known as the "vested rights rule," which may
be stated in its simplest form thusly: if a building permit (or
zoning permit) has been granted by an officer authorized to
issue it, in comformity with the applicable ordinances, and
the permittee has acted in reliance thereon, incurring expenses,
the right to continue construction under the permit becomes a
vested right which the municipality, in the absence of public
necessity, has no right to violate.30
An illustration of this doctrine's application in South Carolina
is Pendleton v. City of Columbia.3' Here the plaintiff was
granted a permit to build an addition to her residence. This was
to be used as an apartment and would have increased the number
of family units in the entire building to two, the maximum
number permissible under the city zoning ordinance. The plain-
tiff contracted with a builder and work was begun by which
the plaintiff incurred expenses of approximately one thousand
dollars. Following protests by the plaintiff's neighbors, the city
council revoked the permit, claiming the ordinance was being
violated.32 The city engineer had determined that the building
was proceeding in accordance with the approved plans. The
court found that the plaintiff had acted upon the permit in good
faith and that her property might be imperiled by her being de-
prived of the privilege to complete the construction.33 Therefore,
the court held that the plaintiff had acquired a vested property
right, entitled to the court's protection, and, "in the absence of
any public necessity for doing so,"3" the city council had no
authority to revoke the permit.35
This problem, in its purest form, has only come before the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Pendleton. Consequently,
there have been no pronouncements concerning the extent to
which a landowner must rely, by changing his position, upon the
permit.86 A survey of other jurisdictions is not particularly
enlightening. There is general agreement that a substantial
30. Pendleton v. City of Columbia, 209 S.C. 394, 399, 40 S.E2d 499, 501
(1946) ; 13 Am. Jua. 2D Buildings § 10, at 274 (1964); 1 YoxLEY § 9-5, at
403.
31. 209 S.C. 394, 40 S.E.2d 499 (1946).
32. Originally the plaintiff had submitted plans for a two-unlt addition,
which would have violated the ordinance, but had modified them to the city
engineer's satisfaction. Id. at 396, 40 S.E2d at 500.
33. Id. at 398, 40 S.E2d at 501.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The question has arisen in related cases. E.g., Lominick v. City of Aiken,
244 S.C. 32, 135 S.E2d 305 (1964).
1968]
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expense must be incurred, but no court has attempted to draw
any finer line.
7
In one rather unique decision in this state, a landowner ob-
tained the benefit of the vested rights rule without ever actually
receiving a building permit. 8 After being assured by Eau
Claire town officials that his land was in a district zoned for
business use, the plaintiff executed a long-term lease to an oil
company (for the operation of a gasoline station), borrowed
$21,000.00, contracted with a builder to erect the station, and
bought a new home. (Formerly, the plaintiff had maintained a
residence on the lot in question.) The town council then refused
to issue the required building permit. Two months later, Eau
Claire merged with Columbia. The plaintiff's application was
then denied because the city considered all newly annexed terri-
tory residential in nature, until a zoning ordinance covering the
area could be enacted. The master in equity for Richland County
required the city to issue the permit, concluding that the Eau
Claire town council had no right to refuse its issuance, and
invoking the maxim "equity will regard as done that which ought
to have been done."13  The South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed, agreeing that "equity and good conscience demand that
Columbia stand in Eau Claire's shoes."40 The court determined
that the plaintiff's right had become vested before the consolida-
tion of the cities, and, therefore, that any subsequent Columbia
ordinance was irrelevant.
41
It must be remembered that a building permit alone does not
confer or alter vested rights. A change of position, incurrence
of expenses, and the like is necessary. The permit alone is only a
personal right of the permittee. This point was crucial in Pa-
metto Petrolewm, Inc. v. City of Mullins,4 2 a recent South Caro-
lina case in which a novel question was raised before the court.
The property owner obtained a permit from the city of Mullins
to construct a service station but, seven months later, sold the
land without having incurred any construction expenses. The
plaintiff, transferree of the original permittee, contracted for the
construction of the station. The city then enacted an ordinance
zoning that area for residential use only. The court held that
37. 1 YorK.EY § 9-5, at 407.
38. Kerr v. City of Columbia, 232 S.C. 405, 102 S.E.2d 364 (1958).
39. Id. at 411, 102 S.E.2d at 366.
40. Id. at 412, 102 S.E.2d at 367.
41. Id. at 413, 102 S.E.2d at 367.
42. 251 S.C. 24, 159 S.E.2d 854 (1968).
[Vol. 21
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a building permit does not inure to the benefit of a subsequent
purchaser of the property, as it is only a non-assignable personal
privilege of the permittee, and does not run with land, as a
variance does.43 Therefore, as the permit was never more than
a personal privilege of the plaintiff's transferor, the plaintiff
had no right to rely upon it. When the land was sold, the permit
became a nullity.44
IV. EXCEPTONS TO THE VEsTED RInGsS R=m
A. Improperly Issued Permits
Generally, a building permit issued in violation of law, or
under some mistake of fact, confers no right or privilege on the
permittee.4 5 Although this problem has not arisen in South Caro-
lina, the law is well-settled elsewhere that such an improperly
issued permit confers no vested right on the permittee and
may be summarily revoked notwithstanding reliance, expendi-
tures, or changes of position by the landowner.
46
B. Subsequent Action by the Municipality
Quite often, after issuing a building permit, a municipality
may desire to revoke the permit by subsequent enactments. If
the permittee's right has not become "vested," most jurisdictions
allow the revocation of the permit by a subsequent ordinance
which prohibits the use for which the permit was issued.4 This
is apparently true even though no pressing and immediate public
need is served by the ordinance. The South Carolina Supreme
Court has never decided this precise question, i.e., just what
effect a valid subsequent zoning ordinance has on a building
permit which has not yet become vested. The question was before
the court in Palmetto Petroleum, but, having determined that
the permit in that case became a nullity when the permittee sold
the property without acting on the permit, the court declined
to make a decision on the effect of the subsequent ordinance.43
43. Id. at 27, 159 S.E.2d at 856. This reasoning seems questionable. Why
should a right to put land to a permitted use be given less weight than a right
to except land from the permitted uses to which the zoning ordinance restricts
it?
44. Id.
45. 1 YoKsxy § 9-6, at 412.
46. See, e.g., Vogt v. Borough of Port Vue, 170 Pa. Super. 526, 85 A.2d
688 (1952).
47. 13 AM. Ju. 2D Buildings § 10, at 275 (1964) ; 1 YoKLEY § 9-6, at 413.
But see Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960).
48. Palmetto Petroleum, Inc. v. City of Mullins, 251 S.C. 24, 27, 159
S.E.2d 854, 856 (1968). However, at least one authority feels the South
Carolina court has already expressed its view on this issue in Douglass v.
City Council of Greenville. 13 Am. Jun. 2D Buildings § 10, at 275 n.7 (1964).
1968] N om
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As demonstrated earlier, a mere resolution of the city council
is not considered a zoning ordinance and is not sufficient to
revoke any building permit, vested or not.49 Likewise, a sub-
sequent ordinance which is found to be invalid or unconstitu-
tional will not revoke the permit. Therefore, the attempt to
confer power on neighboring landowners in Willi and the ordi-
nance conferring unlimited discretion upon the city council
in Henderson had no effect on the building permits in those
cases.
More difficult questions arise when the permittee has incurred
expenses in reliance on the validity of his permit, and the
municipality subsequently passes an ordinance which prohibits
the originally permitted use.
Most jurisdictions have approached this problem by attempt-
ing to determine whether or not the permittee's right has become
vested. If it has, a subsequent municipal ordinance cannot
revoke the permit. 0 Apparently, the theory is that a non-
conforming use has been established, the removal of which is
not within the scope of this discussion.51 Obviously, a court
using this approach must indulge in linedrawing to determine
when sufficient "substantial" expenditures have been made, in
reliance on the validity of the permit.
The South Carolina court has avoided this predicament in a
direct, if puzzling, way. The court has looked to the purpose of,
and public interest protected by, the subsequent ordinance, rather
than to the extent to which the permittee has relied upon the
validity of his permit. For example, in Douglass v. City Council
of Greenville,52 the landowner obtained a building permit to
construct a stable within the city limits of Greenville. This
permit was issued by the city engineer. The city council then
enacted an ordinance prohibiting the opening of a stable at any
place within the city where a stable had not been operated before
the ordinance, without special permission from the city council.
The ordinance listed five factors which the council would rely
upon in deciding whether to grant such permission.53 The
plaintiff was denied the requisite permission, although he had
contracted with a builder, and construction was in progress.
49. Lominick v. City of Aiken, 244 S.C. 32, 43, 135 S.E2d 305, 310 (1964).
50. 1 YoxLY" § 9-5, at 406.
51. See generally 2 YOKLEY § 16.1 et seq.
52. 92 S.C. 374, 75 S.E. 687 (1912).
53. Id. at 377, 75 S.E. at 688.
[Vol. 21
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Noums
The state supreme court upheld the ordinance as a valid and
reasonable exercise of the police power, against which the plain-
tiff's extensive (and expensive) reliance on his permit could
not prevail.54 The court went so far as to say that the same
result would follow if the construction had been completed, as
long as the protection of public health and safety is involved."5
This reasoning causes one to doubt that the vested rights rule
is very deep-rooted in this state, despite the strong statements
which the court has made in support of the rule,5 6 as apparently
a municipality can bypass the rule with a sufficient showing of
public interest in passing a subsequent ordinance. In addition,
one can only wonder as to the importance of the unanswered
question in Palmetto Petroleum, the effect of a subsequent
ordinance on a naked permit.57 If a subsequent ordinance can
divest a permittee of a vested right, surely it can nullify his
mere permit. Further speculation suggests the court is approach-
ing a much more difficult area of line-drawing, in determining
whether or not the ordinance in question is one protecting "the
public health and safety."58 For example, an ordinance prohibit-
ing only one particular use over the whole city (as the livery
stable in Douglass) might qualify more easily than one which
only adjusts the limits of certain business, professional, indus-
trial, or residential districts.59 However, it can well be argued
that these general zoning ordinances are just as strongly based
on public need.60 It is difficult to see any definite standards
54. Id. at 382, 75 S.E. at 689.
55. Id. at 383, 75 S.E. at 690. This seems dubious. Surely the completed
construction of a business should give it the status of a non-conforming use,
regardless of whether or not it has opened for business.
56. E.g., Pendleton v. City of Columbia, 209 S.C. 394, 399, 40 S.E.2d 499,
501 (1946).
57. See note 48 supra.
58. Douglass v. City Council of Greenville, 92 S.C. 374, 383, 75 S.E. 687,
689 (1912).
59. Valid public interests (the detrimental effects of a bus station on a
near-by library and high school) were in issue in Carolina Scenic Stages v.
City of Columbia (trial order, S.C. Cir. Ct., 5th Jud. Cir. 1960), but were
raised only in hearings before the public service commission. The zoning
ordinance prohibiting bus stations contained no reference to these interests,
and specified no factors which the city council would use in determining
whether or not to grant the required special permission. Judge Ness, on the
authority of Henderson, declared the ordinance invalid on its face, and did
not have to reach a determination of whether or not the public interests being
protected were sufficient to override the vested interest of the permittee bus
company.
60. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 47-1105 (1962) allows a municipality "in the interest
of the public health, safety, order, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general
welfare" to adopt a zoning ordinance for the purpose of regulating "any use of




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss1/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEw
of public health or safety in these decisions. More definite
guidelines are needed for adequate counsel to be given to land-
owners on the possible effects of subsequent ordinances.
V. PENDING AMEND NTS
A final municipal action which prevents the exercise of land
use in accord with an existing ordinance is the issuance of a
"hold order" by a city council, prohibiting the issuance of build-
ing permits until a pending amendment to a zoning ordinance is
passed upon. Although the point has never been before the
South Carolina court, except perhaps indirectly in Kerr v. City
of C'oWumbia,61 the majority view today appears to allow the
refusal of a building permit if at the time of application there
is pending an amendment to a zoning ordinance which, if
enacted, would prohibit the use for which the permit is being
sought. 2 The policy, as with most of these municipal enactments
is to prevent additional nonconforming uses to be established.
These would have to be dealt with after the amendment was
passed, by amortization 8 or some equally lengthy process, so
the courts, in this instance, have allowed the municipality to nip
them in the bud.
VI. CoNCLusION
To reiterate briefly, in South Carolina the holder of a valid
building permit who actually commences construction and incurs
liability for work and materials may acquire a vested property
right which he is entitled to have protected. However, the
express or implied revocation of a building permit has been
sustained where, subsequent to its issuance, the municipality
passes a valid ordinance which has the effect of prohibiting the
heretofore permitted use. This may be the result even though
the permittee has substantially relied on the permit. Lesser
actions by municipalities have generally failed to overcome this
vested right.
Therefore, the attorney in our hypothetical situation might
well advise his client to seek written assurances from city offi-
cials as to the lack of any city ordinance prohibiting the desired
61. 232 S.C. 405, 102 S.E2d 364 (1958).
62. 1 YoxLEY § 9-7.
63. A recent case, Jones v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661
(1956), suggests amortization is improper in this state. But see S.C. CoDn
AuN. § 14-350.17 (Supp. 1968).
[VoI. 21
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use. lie should then attempt to obtain the necessary permits as
speedily as possible. If they are refused without a valid reason,
mandamus is available. Once obtained, the land-owner, or his
lessee, should begin the transformation of the property as soon
as possible, in the hope that, should his right to so use the land
be questioned, the right will have attained vested status.
It is difficult to imagine any situation in which a landowner
has a greater right to rely upon his municipality than where he
has properly obtained a valid building permit for a use which
conforms with all current zoning and building ordinances. Yet
this discussion has revealed many attempts by that same muni-
cipality to deny this right of reliance, some of which have
succeeded. It is submitted to the prudent landowner that reliance
upon present conditions may prove fruitless, unless coupled with
a sagacious insight into the future.
THaOMAS Euoan ALLEN, III
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